2018 in review….

Given that we are closing in on the end of the year, I thought I would publish a quick recap on those positions that I previously wrote about, namely:

  • Pioneering Technologies
  • Titan Logix
  • Reliq Health Technologies
  • Total Telcom

Unfortunately, like most of the Canadian small cap market, all of these are either in the toilet or treading water. However, each of these has its own particular story. Without further ado, I’ll launch into it….


PTE logo

Pioneering has been perhaps the biggest disappointment of 2018, as not only did it fail to meet revenue targets, it’s share price also cratered catastrophically. As of today (December 12th 2018), Pioneering is trading at $0.10, roughly a  90% drop from its price back in late 2017. The short & not-so-sweet reason for this skid is “over promise and under deliver”. Given the attention and buzz that was created around Pioneering in 2016 and 2017, investor expectations became inflated, and when increased sales didn’t show up, the bottom dropped out of the share price.

For those of you that have been following this story, this is all old news. The real question is “what now” ? Now that the market cap is a shadow of it’s former self, is this company on the scrap heap, or does it have a future ?

Clearly, if I knew the answer to this, I’d already be on my island somewhere. That being said, we can take a look at “what is” to determine “what might be”:

  • The balance sheet (as of June 2018) remains debt free, with $5.7 MM of cash and short term investments.
  • Assuming that sales are still slow to materialize, and cash is still being burned up at the same rate, PTE could be consuming between $225,000 and $360,000 per month, or cash burn of $1.575 MM to $2.52 MM for the 7 months from July – Dec 2018.
  • If this is indeed occurring, then cash and short term investments, as of December 2018,  could be as low as $3.2 MM to $4.1 MM.
  • This in turn means that net equity per share (using the fully diluted share count) could be as low as $0.13 to $0.15 per share, after adjusting for cash consumed.
  • If one eliminates all long term assets, then the Net-Net book value per share (using the fully diluted share count) falls between $0.11 and $0.12 per share.
  • Lastly, if one adjusts for potential cash consumed, the adjusted Enterprise value (using the fully diluted share count)  is between $2.35 MM and $3.25 MM.

So, at todays price of $0.10, you are actually buying Pioneering on a “net-net” basis. Is this a good deal ? It depends – if the Pioneering Smartburner is no longer useful, or has become obsolete, then the value of the company is questionable no matter how low the price gets. However, what if sales do (eventually) show up ? Or better yet, what sort of sales have to show up to make a difference ?

If we take a look at the most recent PTE financials (9 months ending June 2018), PTE recorded about $4.5 MM in total costs. Note that we are excluding any gains / losses due to the derivative liability, as this appears to have worked itself off the balance sheet. If we adjust this $4.5 MM for non-cash costs (stock based compensation, amortization and depreciation), it’s reduced to $3.5 MM of cash costs, which suggest that full 12 month costs should land somewhere in the $4.7 MM range, which we will simply round to $5.0 MM. We also know that PTE has managed to maintain gross margins at 50%, so in order to break even on a cash cost basis, PTE needs to see $10 MM in revenue.

Is $10 MM in revenue a pipe dream ? Well, we know that for fiscal 2017, PTE did indeed record $10 MM in revenue at a 50% gross margin, so the answer is “no, it’s not a dream” – they have done it once, and I find it hard to believe that in fiscal 2017 they sold to every possible customer in North America.

Perhaps the better question is why anyone would buy a Smartburner to begin with. Lord knows I wouldn’t – I have a gas stove, and I like instant heat. However, we need to separate the idea of who has the purse strings from what people want. You’ll recall that at some point in your distant past, your parents told you to wear a helmet when you were biking, skiing, or doing most anything that suggested the potential for injury. You, being the disobedient child that you were, likely fought this edict, until such time that your parents reminded you that “while you live in this house, you live by our rules”. They controlled the purse strings, and regardless of your thoughts, you complied. The same is true here – the people that are going to be cooking on a Smartburner sometime in the future won’t be doing so because they want to – they’ll do so because the owner of that home said so.  That owner believes that the “de-risking” of their rental unit is well worth the annoyance of getting used to a Smartburner, as tenants are now less able to burn down the house. With compliant UL858 stoves already in showrooms (I have seen them), the trend for safer coil top stoves is here to stay. Naysayers would suggest that if compliant stoves are on the market, the landlord will just buy one of those. Well, maybe – if you have the nicest landlord in the world. One thing about landlords is they like to control costs. The Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers (AHAM) suggests that a basic coil top stove lasts between 18 and 22 years. If I am a landlord, I’m not shelling out $400 for a new stove if I can make my existing stove (which has another 10 years of life) compliant for half that cost. While you might concede this point, you might also be saying that the vast majority of landlords simply won’t buy a Smartburner, because nobody says they have too – and you are right. Pioneering doesn’t need every coil top stove to be converted, they just need some. To be specific, with over 40 million rental households in the US, they just need a very small slice of some.

So, at the end of the day, I don’t believe Pioneering is heading for bankruptcy. I do believe it was overpromoted (which led to the run to $1.50), but the concept of kitchen fire safety, an aging population, and all those rental households in the US have not gone away. I believe that at the current price of $0.10, PTE may provide some significant upside (assuming sales materialize), and is suitable for very risk tolerant small cap investors. Of course, I may be wrong, and that may cause people to call me various names, some unflattering. That’s ok – I’ve been called many things, and have survived them all. I continue to be long, and have purchased at the current price.


Titan Logix

Some of the things I end up going long on gets lots of press – and others don’t. Titan falls into this category, as despite consistent improvement, it keeps skipping along at basically the same price.

Titan year end numbers, released on November 29th, revealed the following:

  • Revenue up 28% vs prior year.
  • Cost of goods down 3% vs prior year.
  • Gross margin up 90% vs prior year.
  • All other cash costs up 8% vs prior year.
  • EBITDA is still negative but is significantly improved at  -$0.256 MM vs -1.11 MM.
  • The company remains debt free.
  • Book value is $0.51/share, and net-net value is $0.35 per share.
  • Cash & short term investments of $8.27 MM, or $0.29 per share.

While it is true that Titan is still EBITDA negative and burned a whopping $500,000 over the course of the year, this has to be viewed in the context of a recovering energy market. As we all know, commodities are cyclical – when prices are lousy, producers stop drilling, consumers keep consuming, and eventually prices start recovering. Around that time, producers decide to start drilling again, but since bringing new production on isn’t like flicking on the light switch, there tends to be a bit of a lag, at which time price really starts recovering – not exactly rocket science.

So Titan is managing to actually increase revenues (and gross margins)  while keeping a lid on G&A costs – all in the context of an energy market that isn’t running on all cylinders. This begs the question – what will things look like once activity starts to pick up even more ?  While I don’t know the answer to that, I do know that Titan remains a low risk play on the energy sector and has significant upside potential. At this point, the market is valuing a debt free company at slightly more than the assets on the balance sheet, suggesting that any future cash flows will be worth the square root of zero – a proposition which I don’t believe. While I don’t know when the market will notice, I’m glad to wait and potentially pick up more as the price drifts through the low ~ $0.50 range.


RHT image

I had never actually intended to write about Reliq, but when they released their infamous “we have to restate revenues” press release, they provided a textbook case of a company that I try to avoid like the plague. Overvalued, overhyped, and with a balance sheet and an exploding share count that assault the senses.

To be fair, I should point out that I did indeed own Reliq at one point, as I indicated in my prior post.  However, once the valuation of Reliq started to get beyond what I could understand, I sold for a tidy profit. I will freely admit that the company has never been a favorite of mine, and because of this I cannot profess to have the depth of knowledge that I might have with other positions. That being said, Reliq hasn’t given investors much to be happy about recently, so if you are bullish on Reliq, I’m guessing you’ve done your homework, or you are simply comfortable with the implied risk.

All of that aside, the question as always is “what to do today” ? The share price is obviously much lower, so perhaps this represents a reasonable entry point.

Whenever I’m about to take a position such as this, I try to map out where things are today versus where they might go tomorrow, which is not unlike how I view my position in Pioneering Technologies. For Reliq, I took the time to map out the numbers, as shown below:

Reliq valuation at Dec 14 2018

This table shows us the value (in terms of Market Cap and Enterprise Value, or EV) as of the most recent financials, and what the EV of Reliq might be as of December 31st 2018 assuming a low cash burn rate of $427,000 per month, and what the EV might be assuming a high cash burn rate of $1.03 MM per month. Both of those cash burn rates tie back to the most recent financials, where it indicated that Reliq used $1.28 MM ($427,000 per month)  after changes in working capital, or $3.1 MM ($1.03 MM per month) if you exclude changes in working capital.

Some of you may have noticed that I tend to focus on the EV/EBITDA multiple as a general yardstick for valuing a company, as this metric rolls market cap, debt, and cash into one ball of wax. As investors, we are always on the lookout for value, and a company that has high EBITDA and a low Enterprise Value is a reflection of that.

In the case of Reliq, I have shown what the EV could look like as of December 31st, and what sort of EBITDA an investor needs to expect in order to justify some sort of reasonable valuation. For instance, if you believe that Reliq will continue to burn cash at the “low” rate, then estimated year end EV of $23 MM suggests that you need to see EBITDA (at some future point in time) of $2.3 MM in order to justify a EV/EBITDA multiple of 10x.

What we can see is that Reliq needs to book somewhere between $5.75 MM of EBITDA for less aggressive investors who are willing to pay 4x EBITDA, and $1.77 MM of EBITDA for those investors who are very aggressive and are willing to pay 14x EBITDA.  Which leads us to the question – is this possible ? The short answer is maybe – but I’m not holding my breath.

If one takes a quick look at the Reliq financials going back to the year ending June 2016, you can see two things pretty quickly. First , EBITDA has been negative for every year, and not a “little bit negative”, or “negative and trending up”. It has simply been negative every year, and has gotten worse each year. In fact, EBITDA in this last quarter at -3.1 MM is worse than each of the fiscal years ending June 2016, 2017, and 2018.

Secondly, one can see that the cash in the company coffers has arrived as a result of share issuance. So, if you work for one of the firms that underwrote one or more of those share offerings, I must commend you on a job well done, as you managed to raise no less than $18 MM since 2016.

So, while I generally don’t shy away from speculative companies, I will be keeping my distance from this one till further notice. Perhaps Reliq will turn things around – but they’ve got a deep hole to dig themselves out of before that happens.


Total telcom logo


Since my initial post on Total (November 02 2018), not much has really changed, so this will be perhaps my shortest “update”. Nonetheless, Total did issue Q1 financials on the 29th of November ,which were largely neutral:

  • Q1 revenues essentially flat at $346K vs $345K prior year .
  • Cost of goods up 12% vs prior year Q1.
  • Gross margins down 5% vs prior year Q1, at 53% vs 58%.
  • All other cash costs down 6% vs prior year Q1.
  • EBITDA down 11% at $72K vs $81K vs prior year
  • Net earnings of $50 K flat vs prior year Q1.
  • The company remains debt free.
  • Cash on hand of $1.4MM, or $0.057 per share.

As the cop on the street would say, “nothing to see here, move on”, which is what I expect most of the market did. However, there are a few points worth noting that are still interesting. Firstly, its only fairly recently that Total has managed to be EBITDA and cash flow positive (Q1 of 2015), and since hitting this milestone, this is the best Q1 TTZ has recorded since then:

TTZ comparative Q1 since 2015.PNG

With the exception of shares outstanding, which have risen by a measly 1% since 2015, every other metric is improved: the cash balance is consistently growing, and EBITDA, cash flow, and earnings are all the highest they have ever been for a Q1. While this doesn’t necessarily predict the future, it sure doesn’t hurt.

Additionally, overall results for Total last year were muted by the fact that they actually lost some customers in the Environmental services sector (in the US). In addition to this, the heater controller segment was impacted by a shortage of vehicle heaters, which dampened their overall sales in this segment. Despite this, Total exited the year with net income of $476K, or EPS of $0.019.

So, while Q1 numbers weren’t blockbuster, they certainly didn’t make us run for the hills either. Based on what we can see today, barring a major catastrophe, it would seem reasonable that Total can at least repeat last years results. If they do manage to do that, then the current price of $0.18 suggests that an investor might see a flat share price or decline to around $0.14. To be fair, Total has traded as low as $0.12 in the last 52 weeks, but it only traded at that level for less than a month. For the vast majority of its “cellar dwelling”, it has tended to trade around $0.14. So, one could see a worst case loss of 33%, or a more likely loss of 22%.

On the other hand, if Total sees expansion in any one of it’s revenue streams, a lot of that incremental revenue flows straight to the bottom line. In my prior post I highlighted how the company now covers all of its costs from its recurring revenue stream, which means that any increases in existing revenue streams (or any new revenue) is “gravy”. To put this in perspective, for the year ended June 2014, Total booked revenues of $765K, whereas for the year ended June 2018 they booked revenues of $1.78 MM – a CAGR of 23%, all while maintaining gross margins of 50% or more. While last years revenue growth was an anemic 2%, Total previously had revenue growth of 6%, 38%, and 54% for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017. The gist of the argument is that it they have managed very significant growth, and I can’t imagine they recently have thrown up their arms and said “that’s good enough”. With management owning almost 30% of the shares, I’m guessing they have a strong interest in growing the company some more.

With this in mind, we continue to hold our position in Total, given that our cost basis is somewhat lower than the current price, and the fact that liquidity is sometimes limited. Assuming that Total does manage to garner more incremental revenues, we believe this could provide upside of 50% or more.

As always, these are only my thoughts & opinions. If you have questions or comments, I can be reached at greyswan2@gmail.com.





Titan Logix – revisited….

Titan Logix

Following my original post about Titan Logix, I received an email that questioned the thesis of the post. I’ve extracted an excerpt from the email, as follows:

“…sure the company is cheap, but aside from book value, what makes you so sure the price will go up ?”

That is a totally valid question, and I’ll try & address the “whys” here. To (very quickly) recap the original post, there were a number of things that indicated to me that Titan was a relatively low risk buy. Note that I use the same green, amber, & red format, and that I simply list the points rather than going into a detailed explanation. Anyone that wants to review the original post can simply take a look at the prior Titan post to get the details. The distinct areas that I highlighted were as follows:

  • Attractive technical chart
  • Lots of cash & low debt
  • Reasonable cash burn
  • Clean earnings
  • High insider ownership
  • No institutional ownership & no analyst coverage
  • No self promotion
  • No share buyback
  • Out of favor sector
  • Business is easily understood
  • Potentially disruptive technology

One can quickly see that the positives outweigh the negatives. However, not every investor is the same, and not every reader of this blog will have the same understanding of investing, or of this particular sector. This is where I may have come up short in my last post, so I’ll try to flesh things out a bit more here.

The price of a commodity distracts us from what is really happening. We are bombarded by price information all the time, because people can easily identify with the concept of paying too much or getting a bargain. However, when it comes to investing in companies that produce commodities, or companies that are affected by the commodity price, it’s often better to look behind the scenes. The good folks at the U.S. Energy Information Administration must have anticipated my post, because they just updated their forecast for liquid fuel production & consumption, which is shown below.

prod vs cons eia

The first thing that should become apparent here is that production and consumption are always dancing with each other – sometimes one gets ahead of the other, but not by much. The two lines are tightly interwoven, constantly moving in & out of synch. That being said, while consumption & production tend to be intertwined, price is the signal that screams at us that one of them is slightly out of whack. Or, to put it succinctly, the price of crude oil is very sensitive to slight changes in either production or consumption, and therefore can be very volatile.

We have all seen this, as anyone who watches the news is constantly told that WTI is either up or down, and only a few years ago we cursed high oil prices (and high gasoline prices), whereas now we are less likely to do so. To highlight this, a 2nd chart from the EIA illustrates my point:

EIA WTI price 2013-2017

If you look at the first chart, the difference between the production & consumption isn’t particularly striking. However, you can still see that the blue line (production) gets slightly ahead of the khaki line (consumption), and that this gap persists into early 2016. During this time, excess production was likely put into storage, to be slowly worked off later. However, the impact on price is far more volatile, as the 2nd chart indicates. Even though the excess production isn’t enormous, it eventually craters the price by ~ 50%.

So, while both production & consumption tend to move up over time, one is driven by millions of people who tend to consume at a fairly even pace every day,  whereas the other is driven by exploration programs that take a long time to analyze & execute. For instance, if a major project is announced today, that production may not make it to the gas pump for a number of years. In essence, while consumption continues to slowly ticks upwards, producers may slow down or halt production entirely when prices are weak. 

OK. So producers slow down or stop production. What does this mean for Titan ?  A producer company is always trying to balance how much it produces and when. Although many companies employ hedging to get away from the price roller coaster, rarely are companies 100% hedged, and some can be totally unhedged. A quick look at the price cycle since the year 2000 allows us to walk through what happens with both producers and service companies.

Phases of price cycle.PNG

  • During the “low, flat price” part of the cycle: 
    • Producers are keeping a lid on costs, as price signals aren’t so strong that they are clearly signalling boom times. They are likely trying to keep service costs as low as possible, because price can’t cover up poor fiscal discipline. Additionally, because producers are so cost conscious, they are hesitant to spend to bring on new supply. At the same time, demand continues to grow, setting the stage for a demand-supply imbalance, and sowing the seeds for higher prices.
    • Service companies are reasonably busy. However, because prices are relatively flat, there are likely no new entrants into the marketplace. The number of competitors is probably fairly static. Anyone considering entering the market to compete is either well capitalized or has a strong business plan in place, as they know they will have to compete with existing service companies in an environment where producers are cost sensitive. Service companies are, for the most part, price takers.
  • During the “rising prices” part of the cycle:
    • Producers slowly start to see stronger price signals, and become more aggressive. Since they are always compared to their competitors, they are keenly aware of whether or not competitors are producing more than they are. Eventually, this combination of stronger pricing signals and “not wanting to be left behind” causes them to expand activity and bring on more production. In turn, their need for services increases, and they become less cost sensitive, as they can justify paying more given that the commodity price offsets increased service costs.
    • Service companies see their business increase. New service companies may enter the market, seeing increased activity and increased prices. Costs for services may go up, as the equipment of existing services companies is likely seeing higher utilization. New entrants may provide the incremental equipment required by producers, as existing companies may not be able to expand their fleets as quickly.
  • During the “rising & sustained high prices” part of the cycle:
    • Producers are all making money, as the sustained high prices hide all cost overruns. The most poorly capitalized/managed producers (usually chasing the highest cost projects) enter into the market, as with strong prices in hand, they can more easily sell their story in order to raise capital. With all producers running at “full tilt”, competition for services becomes fierce, and the most poorly managed producers drive up the price of services, as they likely lack fiscal discipline. The “produce at all costs” mentality sets the stage for oversupply.
    • Service companies likely have difficulty keeping up, and can therefore become price makers. Sensing the frenzied level of activity, they can effectively name their prices, knowing full well that producers have little choice. Like their producer brethren, even the most poorly managed service companies can turn a profit.
  • During the “low prices..again” part of the cycle:
    • Producers are likely stuck with high cost structure projects that were initiated during the high price environment. Saddled with the costs of these projects (that are not easily shed), they look for any costs they can easily and quickly reduce or eliminate. Negotiations with service companies become an exercise in “passing down the pain”, as they again become price makers out of necessity. New projects are either pushed off into the future or shelved entirely. Inventories of oversupplied commodity are slowly worked down.
    • Service companies see revenue declines and margin compression. Well capitalized service companies whose management (likely) have long tenures and anticipated the end of high prices are prepared, and can weather extended periods of low revenues. Poorly capitalized & poorly managed service companies exit via bankruptcy, or are swallowed by competitors. The pool of available companies shrinks, with only the strongest and best managed companies surviving. Once the cycle begins again, they are the ones that producers will turn to.

So, to answer the question “…what does this mean for Titan ?”, the answer is that the slowing (or stopping) of crude oil production means three things for Titan:

  1. Titan is surviving because of its strong capital structure.
  2. Competitors are leaving (or have left) because they are poorly managed or have a weak capital structure, or both.
  3. When the sector starts to turn, there will be less companies to compete with, which means a higher concentration of business will fall into the hands of Titan.

So these are the reasons, in conjunction with those factors I indicated in the prior post, that make me reasonably certain that Titan will see increased business as the sector turns around, and that in turn will lead to an increase in share price.

As always, I can be reached at:  greyswan2@gmail.com






Titan Logix – a sleepy small cap wakes up.

Titan Logix.PNG

Anyone that has visited this blog before knows that I’ve provided some detailed analysis on positions that I’m already long on, and my thoughts on why I might be staying long (or not). However, in this post I wanted to go through the process as to why I initiate a long position in a company at all, and what factors get me to that point. While I’m sure that many of you are seasoned investors, I thought that some of you might not have as many wrinkles as myself, and therefore might be interested in what I call “the weeding out” process.

That being said, I should probably issue a caveat, in that I have already been long on Titan for a while – specifically, I built my position in Q1 and Q2 of 2018. Therefore, depending on what type of investor you are, you may view this post as entirely educational, given that “the price has moved, and it’s too late to buy into this story”, or you may view it as an opportunity, since “the technical chart is better today than it was back then”. Whatever your perspective, my intent is not to convince you to buy into the Titan story, but rather to “show you the tools I use and how I use them”, for those that are interested. Note that once I start describing the detailed process, I color code the headings green, amber or red to indicate how a particular part of the data influences my decision. 

With that out of the way, let’s get started….

Who is Titan Logix, and what do they do ? Titan, headquartered in Edmonton, Alberta, falls into the category of  “oil & gas services”, so they don’t actually produce any oil or gas, they help the producers in that process. As per their website, their mission statement is “….to provide our customers with innovative, integrated, advanced technology solutions to enable them to more effectively manage their fluid assets in the field, on the road, and in the office.”  Or, in really simple language, Titan provides state of the art technology (gauges & monitoring equipment)  for producers of oil to accurately measure, store, transport,  and safeguard their primary asset – the oil itself. While this doesn’t sound very sexy, producer companies face a lot of scrutiny in how safely they move oil from point A to point B, not only because of safety issues, but also because they want to make sure that every drop that’s in the tanker ends up in the storage tank, or pipeline, or refinery. Not only is spillage frowned upon from a safety & environmental perspective, it’s literally money that’s getting spilled on the ground. So, tracking, measuring, and moving it accurately is their primary service.

How did I find them ? I’m not sure when I first became aware of Titan, but since I allocated capital in Q1 of 2018, I’m guessing I probably found them by around Q2 of 2017. In this particular instance I found an article written by Bob Tattersall, a mutual fund manager who tends to focus on small caps. The article made a compelling case for Titan, so I wrote up a note to myself, and Titan was formally placed on my “watch list”. So, the “finding” process was simply a function of me doing what I usually do, which is reading – the paper, magazines, or online content. Most of the time the headlines (or articles) don’t result in any good ideas, but occasionally one will see something interesting, which is exactly what happened in this case. 

OK. So you found them. How do you make the decision to allocate money ? I look at a number of different factors, which I’ll dissect here.

Attractive technical chart. OK, this is perhaps a bit misleading, because I’m not really a technical kind of guy. However, I have learned that when buying into a position, getting in at the “bottom of the saucer” is often a good place to start. The chart below illustrates what I’m talking about, and was what I was looking at in February of 2018. From this I could make a few observations, specifically:TLA chart Feb 2018

  • From mid-2016 through to February of 2017, the chart was almost flat, which told me interest in the company was low. Most investors that were in for a quick gain were long gone, so the shareholder base should be less flighty.
  • For the most part, volumes traded are also low, which is consistent with the idea that few investors are interested.
  • Low interest typically means low expectations. Low expectations mean that any positive news can potentially move the share price significantly higher. On the other hand, since most everybody has already given up on Titan, negative news probably won’t drive the share price much lower.
  • The moving average prices, in this case the 10 week and 30 week moving averages, had pretty much converged. However, there was no clear breakout to speak of. The share price was drifting along, neither moving up or down much.

So, at this point I established that Titan looked appealing from a very basic technical perspective. From here, I move on to fundamental analysis.

No debt, lots of cash. In most cases, my next stop is almost always the balance sheet. What I’m typically looking for is either no debt or manageable debt. Obviously, no debt is preferable, but if the company has debt, and it’s reasonable given their total cash available or their cash flow, then I’ll still consider them. In this case, the most recent financials available were for the 3 months ended November 2017. A quick look confirmed what I had already read in the prior article – that Titan was sitting on $6.4 MM of cash with no short or long-term debt. Titan 3 months.PNG

On a book value basis, this was equivalent to about $0.22 per share in cash, and total book value (excluding intangibles) was $0.51 per share. At this point, I knew that Titan had potential, but I needed to find out how long this cash might last, as it was clear that they were still losing money. So, my next stop was the cash flow statement.

Reasonable cash burn.  As I indicated, cash on the balance is nice, but if all of it is consumed within one or two quarters, it doesn’t do much good. In this instance I looked at not only the 3 month statements, but the years ended August 2017 and August 2016, as I wanted to get a range of what could happen.  Cash burn from operations ranged from a low of $118,000 (fiscal 2017) to a high of $1.9 MM (fiscal 2016). The 3 month cash burn for Q1 2018 came in at $74,000, implying a full year value of approximately $300,000.

Titan cash flow.PNG

While I couldn’t predict where it would fall in the future, I could safely assume that even the worst of these ($1.9 MM) suggested that the company could operate for up to 3 years, during which time they would be looking for ways to not keep burning cash. This provided further “de-risking” information, as I was comfortable that the company couldn’t be called on outstanding debt, and was also unlikely to spend themselves to death. Additionally, the cash position and the reasonable cash burn gave me some comfort that there probably wouldn’t be a share issuance on the horizon that was going to dilute existing shareholders.

Clean earnings. Once I’m comfortable with the debt and cash situation, I take a look at the income statement to determine how “clean” the earnings are. What I’m looking for is either a lot of change in how revenues & expenses are classified on a year over year basis, or revenues & expenses that are difficult to understand. A quick look at the Titan income statement confirmed that things were pretty simple: Titan 3 month Inc.PNG

Nothing on this income statement screams “this is strange”. Costs are easily understood at a glance, and a deeper dive provides some glimmers of hope. While revenues are only up slightly, gross margins are significantly improved, & total expenses (excluding FX) are only up about 3% YoY. All in all, the income statement doesn’t offer up anything out of the ordinary, so at this point I can move on to qualitative factors.

High Insider ownership. After viewing insider holdings on SEDI, I came to the conclusion that the insider part of the puzzle was neutral for a number of reasons:

  • Directors and Officers do own shares, but not a large amount. Specifically Greg McGillis (CTO – 555,891 shares or ~ 2%) & Angela Schulz (CFO – 374,473 shares or 1.3%) hold shares. Alan Pyke (CEO) was hired as of February 23 2018, so he obviously held no shares at the time I made my first purchases.
  • Other significant individual shareholders on SEDI hold approximately 5.4 MM shares collectively, or about 19%. These are either shareholders that are identified on SEDI as directors, but are not identified as such on the Titan website, or persons who still hold shares but are flagged on SEDI as someone who has “Ceased to be Insider”.
  • The “Article 6 Marital Trust created under the First Amended and Restated Jerry Zucker Revocable Trust dated 4-2-07” holds 7.2 MM shares, or about 25%. This is what puts the insider picture firmly in the “neutral” camp. I could make no assertions about the motivations of this entity. Are they actively seeking to maximize the value of Titan ? I hope so, but I honestly can’t say, so the insider shareholder story flashes amber for now.

No analyst coverage or institutional ownership. I could find no evidence of any recent analyst coverage, or that any mutual funds held a position. The lack of analyst coverage is consistent with what I was expecting, as I would find it unlikely that a company as well capitalized as Titan would need to do a capital raise, which in turn would go hand in hand with analyst coverage. Additionally, the lack of any institutional holdings (outside of the Zucker estate) is a plus, as this means that there is no potential for a large block of shares to be sold off if a mutual fund manager decides to liquidate. The flip side of this is that there is the potential for the shares to get repriced if a mutual fund decides to buy in once results improve.

No “self promotion”.  Quite often, a company will become aware that nobody is interested in them. Lack of interest usually means a depressed share price, which some companies can find understandably bothersome. So, in order to “create a buzz”, they may hire an IR firm to engage the public, or the company itself will start issuing press releases which sound exciting, but simply inflate normal events. A classic example would be “Widget corporation completes sale of widgets to Multi-national accounting firm”, which sounds great. However, at the end of the day, isn’t every company supposed to be trying to make big sales – isn’t that their job ? In the case of Titan, all I found were “business as usual” types of press releases, which confirmed that there wasn’t any artificial inflation of the share price. 

No share buy back.  I could find no evidence of any share buy backs, and the fact that total shares outstanding had remained fairly static confirmed this. This being said, a share buy back is a vote of confidence by management, but lack of a share buy back isn’t necessarily a lack of confidence. If that were the case, this would mean that the vast majority of firms listed publicly would be broadcasting a lack of confidence by virtue of the fact that there was not a share buy back in place. So, rather than being red, this section ends up amber.

Out of favor sector. I think this is fairly self-evident. The energy sector in Canada, and the associated service companies, had been out of favor for a while. One might argue that this is a redundant statement, given the flat chart of Titan. In any case, the fact that the sector was clearly out of favor meant less eyeballs (and money) to compete with.

The business is easily understood. Again, this is a fairly simple concept. If I was on a plane, and had to explain to the guy next to me what Titan did, could I ? I’m fairly confident I could. While I can’t say that I’m an expert in how their monitors (or gauges, or whatever) work, the concept is easily communicated.

Potentially disruptive technology. Lastly, I’m always on the lookout for something that will shake up the marketplace. In this case, I was not aware of anything that Titan was doing that could be called potentially disruptive. That being said, if this was a prerequisite for every investment, I wouldn’t be investing in anything. So this is amber rather than red.


The final verdict – A buy at an average price of $0.52. As I indicated, I ended up buying Titan. While some parts of my research turned up a few amber lights, there was nothing that screamed “run away”. Also, I should be clear about my expecations about Titan:

  • I’m not expecting a 10x return on this. What I am expecting is that the oil & gas sector will recover, as cyclical sectors always do. When that happens, in 3-5 years, Titans revenues will increase, and their valuation and share price will follow.
  • I am expecting an annualized return of somewhere between 15% and 20% over a 3-5 year period. This means a recovery in the Titan share price of somewhere between $0.90 (20% annually over 3 years) and $1.05 (15% annually over 5 years).
  • I believe that this a relatively “low risk” opportunity. Professional money managers will beg to differ, citing the small market capitalization of Titan. However, this is what creates price inefficiency – the perception of “because it’s small, it must be risky” vs the fact that the company is debt free and cash rich, which mitigates a large degree of risk.
  • As of the writing of this (September 14th 2018), Titan has flirted with prices as high  as $0.65, and has closed fairly consistently above $0.60. While these both suggest returns north of 15% over a very short hold period, I believe the oil & gas sector is slowly on the mend, and am willing to hold given the limited downside.
  • Lastly, commodity sectors are cyclical, and the purchase of Titan occurred nearer to the bottom than the top. Energy demand tends to grow slowly and steadily, whereas energy production is driven by skittish producers who often shelve projects until market signals are as obvious as billboards. Although I don’t know when that time will come, I know it will, and in the meantime Titan can weather the storm.

As always, these are only my thoughts and opinions. Let me know if you found this post informative, or if you just have questions or comments.  I can be reached at: greyswan2@gmail.com